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IThe Influence of Law on Sea Power Doctrines:
The New Maritime Strategy and the Future of
the Global Legal Order
Craig H. Allen*
F or much of the 2006-07 academic year, elements of the US Naval War Col-
lege facilitated an elaborate process designed to provide the intellectual foun-
dations for the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and his staff to draw upon in
drafting a new maritime strategy.1 The process brought together experts from
throughout the world to take part in workshops, strategic foundation "war" games,
conferences and listening sessions.2 It was my privilege as the Charles H. Stockton
Chair of International Law to serve as legal advisor throughout the process. This
article summarizes the contributions of the Naval War College International Law
Department (ILD) in the process to develop and define the relationship between
maritime strategy and law, particularly international law, and provides the au-
thor's thoughts on what course that strategy should take.
Three decades have now elapsed since Daniel Patrick O'Connell challenged our
thinking with his book The Influence of Law on Sea Power.3 In it, the New Zealand
law of the sea expert and Chichele Professor of Public International Law argued,
shortly before his death in 1979, that because the law of the sea "has become the
stimulus to sea power, not its restraint,"4 future naval operations planning staffs
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must acquire a thorough appreciation of the law.' In contrast to Admiral Alfred
Thayer Mahan and the more recent naval historians who, while providing illumi-
nating analyses of the influence of sea power on history,6 mostly disregard the in-
fluence of international law on sea power, Professor O'Connell forcefully argued
that sea power doctrines can no longer be considered in isolation from the relevant
law. More importantly, O'Connell recognized that international law can be a pow-
erful strategic enabler. The question I asked myself as I launched into my new task
last fall was, "Has the naval strategy community heeded Professor O'Connell's ad-
monition?" Let me attempt to answer that question by taking the reader on a brief
tour of our maritime strategy development process and the role of law and legal ad-
visors in that process.
The Maritime Strategy Project
At the June 2006 Current Strategy Forum, Admiral Mike Mullen, one year into his
tenure as CNO (and one year before his nomination as Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff), called for the development of a new maritime strategy to guide the
maritime services in the coming years. 7 It is to be a strategy of this age and for this
age. The new strategy document, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,8
developed under the overall leadership of Vice Admiral John Morgan, Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations for Plans and Strategy (N3/N5), joins several other naval
capstone planning documents, including Sea Power 21,9 which, together with Ma-
rine Corps Strategy 21,10 provides the vision that establishes the strategic ends; the
Navy Strategic Plan, which lays out the ways and means to achieve the vision;II the
CNO-CMC Naval Operations Concept, which addresses the operational principles
that will be used by the services;' 2 and the US Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime
Safety, Security, and Stewardship.13 At the June 12-13, 2007 Current Strategy Fo-
rum, the Commandants of the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard announced
their readiness to join the CNO in signing the new maritime strategy when it is
completed, making it a true strategy of all three sea services.' 4 In the summer of
2006, the CNO tasked the Naval War College to act as broker for an ordered com-
petition of maritime strategy ideas-ideas that would inform and guide the care-
fully selected team charged with drafting the new strategy. It was made clear from
the start that there were no preconceived ideas and that no suggestions were to be
off limits. The War College was also asked to facilitate a conversation with the
country-indeed with the world-to describe our process and solicit feedback.1
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Security Strategies in the United States
We were not asked to compose the new strategy on a blank canvas. Indeed, we
worked on one that was already suffused with an elaborate landscape. The new
maritime strategy will be nested in what has become a multifaceted web of security
strategies for the nation, all of which emanate from the National Security Strategy of
the United States.16 The National Security Act of 1947, as amended by the
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, requires the President annually to submit to the
Congress a National Security Strategy (NSS) report. 17 The President's NSS vision is
in turn implemented by the National Defense Strategy promulgated by the Secre-
tary of Defense and the National Military Strategy issued by the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.18 Closely related to those are the National Strategy for Mari-
time Security, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the Maritime Strategy for
Homeland Security, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism and the National
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. Not surprisingly, many of the
strategy documents have classified versions.
I should add that this was not the first time the US Navy has launched a grand
strategy development project. Indeed, research by the Center for Naval Analyses in
the fall of 2007 identified at least seventeen Navy capstone planning documents
since the 1970s. 19 It is noteworthy for this observer that none of the earlier Navy cap-
stone strategies, or Naval Doctrine Publication 1 on Naval Warfare2 0 -which "intro-
duces who we are, what we do, how we fight, and where we must go in the future"-
expressly discusses the role of law and legal institutions in naval operations, other
than to make a passing reference to the fact that naval mobility would be better as-
sured if the United States acceded to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (1982 LOS Convention).21
Strategy as a Critical Component of the Geo-strategic Environment
Strategy is said to be "a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of
national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national,
and/or multinational objectives. '22 In setting out to achieve those national objec-
tives, strategy must be adapted to the strategic environment in which it will oper-
ate.23 Accordingly, to provide the development team with the foundation they
needed to prepare maritime strategy options for the CNO, the Naval War College
began by convening a Geo-strategic Environment Workshop. The workshop par-
ticipants drew heavily on the National Intelligence Council assessment "Mapping
the Global Future."24 Later, a British perspective was provided by the UK Ministry
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of Defence Development and Concepts Doctrine Centre's "Strategic Trends 2007-
2036."25 The experts' conclusions were sobering.
26
The reader is likely familiar with much of the strategic environmental picture, so
I will only summarize the most salient features. Geopolitical entropy, disorder and
uncertainty are on the rise. 27 The world is said to be suffering from a global security
deficit.28 Unsustainable population growth rates, the "youth bulge" and chronic
unemployment are most pronounced in those regions lying in the so-called arc of
instability. State sovereignty and territorial integrity are on the decline.29 State
powers are increasingly diffused and devolved. Many States, even some of the most
developed States, are besieged by an unrelenting flow of illicit weapons, drugs,
money and migrants across their borders. At the same time, through what some
have described as the democratization of violence and of technology,30 States have
lost their historical monopoly on the large-scale use of force and on access to weap-
ons of mass destruction (WMD) technologies. 3 1 Indeed, the global picture looks
much the same as it did in 1921, when William Butler Yeats penned his apocalyptic
poem The Second Coming
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
Grim verses, indeed, whose dark and disturbing images still ring true.
Economic security is widely recognized as a vital interest of the State. 32 Yet, pres-
ent efforts are not sufficient to meet basic security needs even within the borders of
many States, let alone provide the kind of stability needed by the globalized, inter-
dependent and tightly connected economy of the twenty-first century. Contempo-
rary security strategies must be designed to manage threats to the public order.
Those threats come from States and non-State actors. We are painfully aware that
the threats know no geographical boundaries, particularly as globalization in-
creases the porosity of borders. Accordingly, the threats must be detected and
managed in the commons, at boundaries between the commons and States, and
along the borders of adjacent States.
In an age when the international supply chains that sustain the global economy
and the seas over which those chains are carried are the common concern of all
States, global order-including order on the sea-is the new raison d' tat and
must be the goal of every maritime security policy and strategy. Irresponsible and
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incompetent flag States; failing and failed States; transnational terrorist organiza-
tions; criminal syndicates engaged in trafficking in weapons, drugs and humans;
and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing all undermine order in the com-
mons. Here in the global commons, where the pinch from flag States falling short
in their responsibility to "effectively" exercise jurisdiction and control over their
vessels is felt most acutely,33 the security deficit is most urgent.
The Strategic Foundations Games
Following the August 2006 Geo-strategic Environment Workshop, a series of exec-
utive group meetings and war games were conducted in September and October of
2006 to develop strategic foundations for use in the Maritime Strategy Options De-
velopment Workshop in December. Those options were later vetted through the
Options Refinement Decision Support Event in February of 2007. The Interna-
tional Law Department provided legal advice to all of the war game teams and to
two of the executive groups. Early on in the process, it also provided a brief to the
Red Team Executive Group suggesting possible "lawfare" strategies and tactics that
might be used against the Blue Team. 34 During this same period, the Naval War
College hosted a conference on the maritime implications of China's energy strat-
egy,35 an Intercessional Conference on Maritime Strategy and a workshop entitled
Economics and Maritime Strategy: Implications for the 21st Century.36 ILD attended
each of the events and an ILD member (the author) participated in the Economics
and Maritime Strategy Workshop, submitted a paper on legal interoperability chal-
lenges and made a presentation on international cooperation in securing the mari-
time commons.3 7
The Future Global Legal Orders Workshop
Let me now turn to something of greater interest to readers of this volume, all of
whom will likely appreciate that law-that is, rule sets, legal processes and
international institutions38-is as much a part of the geo-strategic environment,
and therefore the planning "context," as geography, energy, demographics, orga-
nizational culture and technology. The international system consists principally of
sovereign States, who collectively comprise a horizontal, non-hierarchical global
order that has historically been described as one of moderated anarchy, at least by
the realists. 39 Conventional wisdom posits that within that system, international
institutions and organizations ameliorate the anarchy, but with few exceptions
they do so without altering its horizontal structure.
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The experts who participated in the Geo-strategic Environment Workshop ex-
hibited little faith in existing international organizations and in international law.
Three sample findings demonstrate the depth of their skepticism. First, they con-
cluded that "some international organizations are looking long in the tooth and in-
capable of coping with emerging challenges." Next they concluded that "some of
the institutions that are charged with managing global problems may be over-
whelmed by them" and "the number of bilateral agreements will rise as international
organizations continue to fall short in their objectives." Given the experts' harsh
judgment of international organizations and regimes, their prescription, "Interna-
tional Organizations: out with the old, in with the new," should not surprise you.
The Workshop experts' conclusions added credence to the view that interna-
tional law is merely "epiphenomenal. '40 What really affects State behavior is State
interests-that is, the underlying economic and political factors. 41 Legal academics
have expressed related doubts about international law. International lawyers no
doubt recall John Austin's nineteenth-century conclusion that international law
was not positive law at all, but rather a body that partakes more of a moral obliga-
tion, violation of which may provoke the hostility of other nations but not the kind
of sanctions that attend violation of laws promulgated by a sovereign. 42 And H.L.A.
Hart famously observed that because international law lacks the formal structure
of legislative courts with compulsory jurisdiction and official sanctions it is far
more primitive than the municipal law enacted by a sovereign.
43
The Workshop report left some of us wondering whether their views were shared
by international law experts. Mindful that the state of the future global legal order is
a vital component in the geo-strategic environment, the President of the Naval
War College convened a two-day workshop that brought forty-two legal experts
together to examine the global legal order in 2020.44 Those experts were asked to
provide the legal component that is too often neglected in strategy documents.
With few exceptions, military strategists have a long history of giving short
shrift to international law in their writings. 45 The origin of the problem can be
traced back to Carl von Clausewitz, who dismissively referred to those "certain
self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly worth mentioning, known as in-
ternational law and custom." 46 George F. Kennan, the leading architect of Amer-
ica's Cold War containment security strategy, is also remembered for his attack on
what he saw as an excess of "legalism and moralism" in American foreign policy
during the Wilson presidency years.47 Regrettably, international lawyers have not
always done their part to engage with strategy planners, to help them forge plans
that can achieve strategic goals while respecting and even advancing the rule of
law. The experts who came to Newport were ready to do just that, in the hope that
the strategists were ready to listen.
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And what a distinguished group they were. They came to Newport from Argen-
tina and Australia, from Canada and Chile, and from India, Indonesia and Italy. In
all, they represented eleven countries. They were law professors; international law
specialists from the US Departments of State, Justice and Homeland Security and
the Center for Naval Analyses; a Chinese law of the sea scholar; senior legal advisors
to the Indian Coast Guard and the Italian Navy General Staff; the legal counsel to
the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; senior judge advocates for the US Ma-
rine Corps, Coast Guard, and several combatant and fleet commands; and the Di-
rector of the UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea. They brought
backgrounds in international security law, law of the sea, arms control and prolif-
eration, the law of armed conflict, international transportation law, international
criminal law and international organizations.
The Workshop began with a brief discussion of some assumptions proposed by
the conference chair concerning the role and reach of law.48 The first was the prag-
matic observation that the new maritime strategy must be adapted to the global le-
gal order in which it will function. The second was that a robust and respected legal
order has the potential to save lives, by providing predictability and preventing
conflicts, and by providing effective and peaceful means to resolve conflicts that do
arise. The third assumption was that, while the future state of the legal order is un-
certain, it can, to some degree, be mapped and shaped, and-as Thomas Friedman
reminds us-"the future belongs to the shapers and adapters. '49
To avoid what the influential British strategist Colin Gray labels the "sin of
presentism," 50 the legal experts attempted to widen their temporal lens by explor-
ing several "alternative futures," using the scenario-planning method championed
by futurists like Peter Schwartz and Philip Bobbitt.5' They initially discussed six
strawman scenarios that would collectively map the future global legal order, be-
fore adopting an approach that focused on twelve areas of potentially significant
changes in the legal order. For each of the twelve areas, the experts examined the
possible trends in the rule sets, legal processes and institutions, and in compliance
levels. Next, they were asked to consider the consequences of those changes to the
maritime strategy mission inventory and for the means and methods for carrying
out those missions. Finally, they were asked what the new maritime strategy should
say-and not say-about international law.
One would expect that forty-two lawyers from eleven different nations would
find little on which to agree. To some extent, that was the case with this group.
There was, however, one question on which every expert agreed: the new mari-
time strategy should include an express reference to international law. As one ex-
pert put it, international law "is the foundation on which we operate; it is why we
are there."
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The Role of Law in the New Maritime Strategy
As the legal experts concluded, there are a number of compelling reasons to em-
brace the rule of law in the new maritime strategy and no sufficient reason for fail-
ing to do so. The new strategy must be consistent with higher-level security
strategies. The 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States expressly cites
the importance of enforcing the rule of law.52 Similarly, the presidential directive
on national maritime security made it clear that in developing the National Strategy
for Maritime Security (NSMS) the United States will act consistently with interna-
tional and US law.53 The NSMS opens its chapter on "strategic objectives" by quot-
ing the presidential directive to "take all necessary and appropriate actions,
consistent with U.S. law, treaties, and other international agreements to which the
United States is party. . ...54
But even if the higher-level strategy documents were silent on the role of law, a
maritime strategy that acknowledges the importance of law as an ordering force
and a unifying theme for the crucible of international relations-in short, the
"centre" Yeats longed for- will be far more compelling and durable. Such a docu-
ment would also be a source of pride and inspiration for the members of our armed
forces, a confidence-building measure for our friends and allies, and a key enabler
in our ability to shape the future global order.
Law as an Ordering Force
The United States has a long tradition of calling upon international law when it
serves the national interest.5 5 In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
the infant republic raised international law objections to Great Britain's boarding
of US vessels on the high seas and impressment of US sailors into the Royal Navy,
and against the Barbary States for piratical attacks on US merchantmen in the
Mediterranean Sea and its approaches. Two other disputes between the United
States and Great Britain-leading respectively to the Caroline exchange of notes
and the Alabama arbitration award-produced enduring international principles
well known to the readers of this volume.56 More recently, the nation invoked in-
ternational law against Iran for breaching the inviolability of the US embassy in
Tehran and holding US diplomatic personnel and other citizens hostage, and against
the People's Republic of China for its conduct when a US Navy EP-3 was forced to
land on Hainan Island following a midair collision with a Chinese fighter.
Although national interest is surely the midwife of security policy and strategy,57
at the same time States have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to cooper-
ate with other States to achieve shared goals or resolve common problems.
Craig H. Allen
Globalization and its just-in-time and just-enough logistics imperatives have fun-
damentally altered the strategic calculus, virtually mandating a cooperative ap-
proach to maritime security. Accordingly, the new maritime strategy must be
mindful of national interests while remaining ever alert to shared interests. A strat-
egy that narrowly focuses on national interests will surely reinforce existing per-
ceptions of the United States and drive awaypotential partners. By contrast, it takes
but little imagination to see that a new maritime strategy that defines and articu-
lates in compelling terms a framework for achieving shared goals and joint solu-
tions to common problems is much more likely to make other States want to flock
to the nascent 1,000-ship multinational navy.58
Finding common ground among national interests should not be difficult. For
some, the need to promote and protect the international trade and transportation
system on which the globalized and energy-hungry world depends is a vital na-
tional interest.5 9 It is also a shared interest. In the words of some, "commerce craves
security." For other States, particularly those in West Africa, South America and
Southeast Asia, protecting offshore fisheries from poachers is not merely a pursuit
of profit; it is a survival imperative. Still other States consider threats to the envi-
ronment as national "security" issues. Consider, for example, small-island devel-
oping States, for whom global warming and its attendant rise in the sea level
present an existential threat. A strategy that promotes sustainable and equitable ac-
cess to marine living resources and protection of the marine environment is sure to
have broad appeal. At the same time, however, none of these interests can be ob-
tained if the larger system is fraught with disorder and violence. In Abraham
Maslow's hierarchy of human needs, the need for security is exceeded only by basic
needs, e.g., food. 60
Professor Colin Gray asserts that "order is the prime virtue; it is the essential
prerequisite for security, peace, and possibly justice. Disorder is the worst condi-
tion."61 There is, in the minds of many, no longer a "war" to be won, only security
to be secured, extended and maintained, so that war can be prevented. The spread
of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction threatens chaos, as effective power
shifts away from States to non-State actors and super-empowered individuals. To
the extent that civilization rests in part on the control of violence, and the growing
capacity of non-State actors to inflict such violence now casts a menacing shadow
over the planet, the role of law as the deep stratum undergirding international se-
curity becomes more apparent and more urgent. Law has the potential to serve as
the indispensable binding force to check and perhaps reverse our social and insti-
tutional entropy. If the States' grip on law lessens, and States become increasingly
prone to use military force, the binding force so vital to civilization may be fatally
weakened.
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In a geo-strategic environment everywhere characterized by growing uncer-
tainty, rapid change and instability, rule sets can promote greater predictability
and stability. At the same time, rule sets are not legal pixie dust that miraculously
brings order where there was once chaos. They must be given the level of respect
and enforcement necessary for credibility or no State will be willing to rely on
them. Rule sets like the UN Charter, the 1982 LOS Convention, anti-terrorism
treaties and the non-proliferation regime can increase order, but only if they are
complied with.
We recognize that not all States and non-State actors will voluntarily comply
with the rule sets, whether the rules under consideration are those relating to non-
aggression and non-proliferation or to trafficking for profit. If voluntary compli-
ance falls short, we must of course redouble our efforts to rebuild it to the level
necessary for public order. That may come through education, inducement, de-
terrence, or capacity building of States, or of global or regional international orga-
nizations. 62 But make no mistake, while each of these approaches will be vital to
long-term success, they will likely never be sufficient unto themselves to provide
the needed level of security in the coming years. For that, we must add
enforcement.
Because law is not self-executing, no security strategy should be founded on un-
realistic expectations regarding the influence of law on States (let alone on non-
State actors) in the conduct of their foreign and military affairs-particularly when
survival or vital State interests, or "fundamental" religious beliefs, are at stake. Nor
should we delude ourselves about the effectiveness of international organizations
in preserving or restoring peace and security. Yet, even if, as Thomas Hobbes
warned, "covenants, without the sword, are but words and of no strength to secure
a man at all," 63 even the most committed contrarian would not counsel us to turn
our backs on covenants. International law and international organizations like the
United Nations will never be more effective or influential than the leading States
allow them to be.64 If the new US maritime strategy ignores the role of either, we di-
minish the importance of both and undermine their effectiveness. The result will
be a less ordered and less secure world. For that reason, it is vital that the maritime
strategy provide a rule-based approach for enforcing the global legal order.
In considering enforcement approaches I suggest that effective enforcement of
global rule sets will require a new way of thinking that transcends the so-called
"DIME" construct. The DIME approach, which looks to the State's diplomatic, in-
formation, military and economic "instruments of national power," is too narrow
for a global environment in which non-State actors pose significant, even cataclys-
mic, risks to States.65 This Cold War artifact, which is currently taught at US war
colleges, assumes that only a narrow set of instruments is available and that they
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will be used against States.66 In the post-Cold War, post-9/11, post-Bali, Madrid,
London subway and Lebanon 2006-2007 world, it is clear that instruments of na-
tional power will increasingly be used against non-State actors, like Al Qaeda,
Hezbollah and transnational criminal syndicates, and that the DIME approach is
not always well suited to them. The United States already reaches well beyond the
DIME framework, using a variety of leadership, managerial, institutional, cultural,
technological, law enforcement, judicial and financial measures, such as freezing
assets.67 Some of the rule violations that threaten public order are and will remain
"M" (military) issues. But many are "enhanced L" (law enforcement) issues, call-
ing for enhanced law enforcement measures. 68 This broader, "DIME-plus" frame-
work will be vital to any maritime strategy-certainly for the Coast Guard and
other interagency players with maritime safety and security missions. The new
strategy must also acknowledge that without the Coast Guard, US maritime forces
will not have a seamless approach to maritime security, for without it the strategy
will lack the only alternative "end game" to killing your adversaries or detaining
them on remote islands: arresting and prosecuting them. The Coast Guard puts the
"L" factor in what is otherwise a limited DIME tool kit for addressing many of our
maritime security problems. The next strategy must adapt itself accordingly.
Law as a Unifring Theme
Several of the outside experts engaged in the maritime strategy development pro-
cess hosted by the Naval War College highlighted the need for the new document
to include a "compelling narrative" that will ensure it is read, studied and imple-
mented. How do you select a theme that will counter the scores of centrifugal
forces, unify the elements of the strategy, and serve as the leadership spark and cat-
alyst to bring together the three maritime services with overlapping yet unique
identities, the other interagency players so essential to the mission, and interna-
tional friends and allies, while at the same time winning over or at least muting inter-
governmental and non-governmental organizations? I suggest that law and its
proven, albeit imperfect, capability to promote order, security and prosperity can
be a powerful unifying theme and force in the new maritime strategy in the globalized,
media-sensitive world in which we find ourselves. In fact, the new strategy has the po-
tential to go a long way toward rehabilitating the reputation of the United States as an
overweening hegemon that has become tone deaf to the concerns of its allies.69
Global security requires global cooperation and, for many, law provides the
logic and language of cooperation. Adherence to shared rule sets can be an effective
unifying force. Some would go so far as to say it is now embedded in the cosmopol-
itan DNA. For that reason, an explicit embrace of the rule of law could prove to be
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one of the most attractive features of the new maritime strategy for the Navy's in-
teragency and international partners. Promotion and implementation of rule sets
would give the strategy internal coherence and broad external appeal. Any strategy
that downplays, or still worse denigrates, international law and international orga-
nizations, as does the current National Defense Strategy of the United States, ill
serves the nation's long-term interest. Much of the world still considers the United
Nations the primary if not sole source of legitimacy for the use-of force. A strategy
that suggests that military force will be deployed in a manner that some will con-
clude violates the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force or even the threat to
use force against the political independence or territorial integrity of a State, will
further isolate the nation.
The importance of common rule sets, based on international law as a unifying
force in combined operations, will not be lost on those who observed the evolu-
tion of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the recent UN Security
Council resolutions on proliferation threats to international peace and security.
Both make clear that most of the world will insist on an approach that respects in-
ternational law.
Early positions taken by then-Under Secretary of State John Bolton at the July
2003 PSI-participating States' meeting in Brisbane suggested that with respect to
legal justifications for PSI boardings, the United States was "taking nothing off the
table," including the Article 51 right of self-defense. That was understood by some
as advocating a position on boarding foreign flag vessels believed to be transporting
weapons of mass destruction that might go beyond what current international law
permits. At their meeting in Paris three months later, several of the PSI-participating
States responded to the US opening position with a call for all participating States
to subscribe to a common Statement of Interdiction Principles. The two-page
statement eventually adopted at that meeting, and still in force, twice expresses the
participating States' commitment that PSI activities will be carried out in a manner
consistent with international law. Similarly, Security Council Resolutions 1540,
condemning proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to or by non-State ac-
tors, and 1718, applying similar prohibitions to North Korea, both tie any enforce-
ment measures to the applicable rules of international law.
Law and the Expectations of Our Partners
Admiral Harry Ulrich, Commander, US Naval Forces Europe, espouses a relatively
simple formula for the global war on terrorism: have more partners than your ad-
versaries have. The reasons are elementary. The struggle against disorder knows no
flag. Waging that struggle has become a team sport. Vice Admiral Morgan has been
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the leading voice for the 1,000-ship multinational navy/Global Maritime Partner-
ship, a concept designed to attract the kind of partners Admiral Ulrich seeks. Does
the Global Maritime Partnership (and the Global Fleet Station initiative70 ) need a
unifying global maritime strategy that promises to respect the rules of interna-
tional law? Many of the potential 1,000-ship-navy partners think so.7'
In their response to the November 2005 "1,000 Ship Navy" article by Admirals
Morgan and Martoglio, 72 the naval commanders of France, Ghana, India, Portugal
and Spain all referred to the rule of law or legal considerations. 73 The French com-
mander, for example, observed that any 1,000-ship-navy operations must be "in
full compliance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea .... Portugal ex-
pressly referred to the "rule of law," and India asked whether the 1,000-ship con-
cept should be established under the aegis of the United Nations. Admiral Soto of
the Spanish Navy observed that "[t]ogether we must find a legal solution to pre-
serving the natural flow of friendly maritime trade while denying freedom of action
to those criminals who attempt to use the maritime space for illegal activities." It
seems clear that respect for international law has the potential to unite or fracture
the embryonic 1,000-ship navy.
One year later, many of those same foreign CNOs were asked to respond to
Admiral Mullen's plan for a new US maritime strategy. 74 Once again, interna-
tional law figured prominently in several of the responses. The Commandant of
the Brazilian Navy urged that the new strategy "be guided by principles sanc-
tioned by international law," a viewed shared by the Secretary General of the Pe-
ruvian Navy and the Portuguese Navy Chief of Staff. Their counterpart in
Colombia emphasized the need for an "international legal mechanism of cooper-
ation." Uruguay's reply was also directly on point: "Multilateral cooperation
among navies is legitimate activity when it is based on the law." The Commander
of the Lebanese Navy cited the 1982 LOS Convention and cautioned against the
United States acting alone, while the new Chief of Staff for the Spanish Navy
highlighted the need for the US Navy "to operate alongside its allies in accordance
with international law." The Australian Maritime Doctrine elegantly and force-
fully captures the central importance of law and legitimacy for one of America's
most respected partners:
Australia's use of armed force must be subject to the test of legitimacy, in that the
Government must have the capacity to demonstrate to the Parliament and the
electorate that there is adequate moral and legal justification for its actions .... [T]his
adherence to legitimacy and the democratic nature of the Australian nation state is a
particular strength. It is a historical fact that liberal democracies have been more
successful in the development and operation of maritime forces than other forms of
government, principally because the intensity and complexity of the sustained effort
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required for these capabilities places heavy demands upon a nation's systems of state
credit, its technological and industrial infrastructure, and its educated population.
Sophisticated combat forces, in other words, depend directly upon the support of the
people for their continued existence. 75
Finally, a bit closer to home, in the 2007 US Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime
Safety, Security, and Stewardship, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, who you
will recall will be asked to join in the coming maritime strategy, has clearly identi-
fied the need to update and strengthen maritime regimes to address emergent
threats and challenges and to support US ocean policy. More specifically, the Com-
mandant has concluded that the "nation needs a set of coordinated and interlock-
ing domestic and international regimes that.., balance competing uses within the
maritime domain" and that "[s] trengthened rules, authorities, and agreements...
enable consistent, coordinated action on threats and provide an acceptable frame-
work of standards that facilitate commerce and maritime use." 76 The lessons seem
plain: a Navy-led maritime strategy that similarly acknowledges the important
contributions of rule sets to promoting public order is far more likely to attract the
support of international and interagency partners. 77
Law and Our Opportunity to Shape and Influence
Serious students of international law and relations understand that the law is not
complete, nor is it perfect. We also know that it can and will be influenced,
adapted, developed, clarified and explained-in other words, shaped-in the com-
ing years. Who will be most influential in the law development enterprise? Those
who embrace the rule of law, while working to remedy its shortfalls, or those who
sullenly turn their backs on the enterprise? 78
In his 2006 Current Strategy Forum remarks, Admiral Mullen cited as two of the
nation's three enduring naval strengths the capacity to "influence" and "to build
friends and partners." The legal experts had something to say about both. There
seemed to be widespread agreement among the experts that it is not enough to sim-
ply know and follow the rules of international law; there is also an urgent need to
shape those rules. 79 For example, leadership on freedom of navigation and over-
flight-for warships and military aircraft and the commercial vessels and aircraft
on which the global economy depends-will be crucial in the coming years. Some
experts' assessments reveal the magnitude of the coming challenge to shape inter-
national maritime law on navigation issues:
. 38 percent of the experts believe that the regime for innocent passage in the
12-mile territorial sea will not remain stable between now and 2020. When they
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were asked the same question about transit passage through international straits
and archipelagic sea lanes passage, the numbers went up to 41 percent and 51
percent respectively.8 0
0 95 percent of the experts believe that in the coming years more States will
claim the right to exercise jurisdiction and control over military activities in their
200-mile exclusive economic zones.8 l
To lead on freedom of navigation and overflight, or any other law of the sea is-
sue, it is crucial that the United States become a party to the 1982 LOS Convention
and participate in the United Nations' annual law of the sea processes. Moreover,
to encourage others to respect those parts of the rule set about which we are most
concerned-the navigation rights of warships and military aircraft and the non-
proliferation regime, for example-we must be clear that we respect the entire rule
set,8 2 as consented to by each State, including the provisions that might seem less
important or even "quaint" to us. We cannot hope to "shape" the global or regional
legal order unless we are a good-faith participant in the system. After all, why
would any State acquiesce in letting us help define a rule set if they know that-we in-
tend to later exempt ourselves from it?
At the same time, there is growing concern that law is increasingly used by less
powerful States and by non-State actors as an asymmetric instrument to discredit or
otherwise balance against more powerful States, even proclaiming that less powerful
States are not bound by the same rules.8 3 It has been observed that less powerful
States respond to sea control strategies by more powerful adversaries by employing
sea denial strategies and tactics. Naval mines commonly come to mind,8 4 but lately
"lawfare" strategies seek to restrict the navigation rights and freedom of action of
powerful States by exerting pressure on them to bind themselves to new legal re-
gimes,85 or by employing existing legal regimes to discredit the more powerful
State. As Professor Davida Kellogg at the University of Maine has argued forcefully,
the response to such tactics must not be a reflexive denigration of law, but rather a
decisive and well-reasoned rejoinder that unmasks this abuse of the law.8 6
The new maritime strategy will almost certainly have an effect on the law by what
it says--or does not say-about the role of law in modern maritime security opera-
tions.87 In a system where international law is made in part by State practice, navies
make international law every day by what they say and what they do. At the same
time, and for the same reason, the strategy's treatment of law will affect the ability
of the United States to influence the future direction of international regimes and
organizations. The Navy can create or ease friction by what it says or does not say
about the law in the new strategy and enhance or erode its credibility and therefore
its effectiveness as a shaping influence.88
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Law's Role in Preserving and Enhancing the Service Ethos
At an early Naval War College session involving veterans of prior Navy maritime
strategy drafting teams, Professor Roger Barnett spoke of the importance of under-
standing the Navy's culture in crafting any capstone strategy document. That cul-
ture, it seems to me, plainly includes a deep appreciation for international law. In
describing the most desirable qualifications for a naval officer, Captain John Paul
Jones wrote more than two hundred years ago that the "naval officer should be fa-
miliar with the principles of International Law ... because such knowledge may of-
ten, when cruising at a distance from home, be necessary to protect his flag from
insult or his crew from imposition or injury in foreign ports." 89 US Navy Regula-
tions have long codified the requirement for its members to comply with interna-
tional law.90 Compliance is facilitated by a proactive training and education
program.
International law was among the first subjects taught in the opening days of the
Naval War College in 1884 and the Naval War College is still the only war college in
the United States to have a dedicated International Law Department. The first ci-
vilian to join the Naval War College faculty was James R. Soley, appointed in the
foundation year of the College to teach international law. In 1901, the well-known
publicist John Bassett Moore joined the faculty as a professor of international law
and later initiated the College's International Law Studies ("Blue Book") series.
The first academic chair at the Naval War College was the Chair in International
Law, established on July 11, 1951, and filled by Harvard's Bemis Professor of Inter-
national Law and Permanent Court of International Justice Judge Manley 0. Hud-
son. In 1967 the chair was named in honor of Rear Admiral Charles H. Stockton,
an international law scholar and former president of the Naval War College.
Our personnel have a right to expect that their capstone strategy will honor the rule
of law. We have a new generation of men and women who are drawn to the all-volunteer
forces by a combination of pride, patriotism and the need for self-affirmation. They
are at their best when they believe in themselves, their service and their nation. Our
accession programs and ceremonies emphasize respect for law and principle. The
oath of office for military officers includes a pledge to support and defend the Con-
stitution of the United States-not a monarch, but rather a body of law. Our oldest
warship in commission is named not after a president or a famous battle, but rather
that same hallowed legal text. The core principles of the Navy, Marine Corps and
Coast Guard all highlight the importance of honor, which for Marines expressly in-
cludes the obligation to respect human dignity. Those creeds also recognize the im-
portance of courage, one version of which expressly includes "moral courage,"
describing it as the inner strength to do what is right and to adhere to a higher
Craig H. Allen
standard of conduct. 91 The service members who take these oaths and are moved
by these creeds represent our nation's finest, and they deserve to know more than
merely how and where they will fight; they deserve to know why they fight-that
is, the principles they are being asked to support and defend. The Navy lieutenant
junior grade leading her boarding team onto a freighter in the Arabian Gulf to
conduct a Proliferation Security Initiative boarding and the battalion landing team
sergeant major ordering his Marines into the LCACs and CH-46s to execute a non-
combatant evacuation operation should both be able to see their core values re-
flected in the maritime strategy that sent them on their missions.
Conclusion
The decision by the Naval War College to integrate faculty from the College's In-
ternational Law Department and outside legal experts into the strategy develop-
ment process wisely ensured that the core strategy development team had access to
a thoughtful and informed assessment of the future global legal order. Legal partic-
ipation in the process by no means assures that the law will play a role in the new
strategy, but there's every reason to believe that it will.
Respect for the rule of law is a signal strength for those who practice it and a vex-
atious, corrosive and embarrassing source of friction for those who fail to do so. By
clearly embracing a position that promises respect for the rule of law in the new
maritime strategy, the Navy can seize the opportunity to enhance its legitimacy and
its ability to attract coalition partners, instill pride in its members and position it-
self more effectively to shape the global order. The Coast Guard has shown the way
forward with its new Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship.92 But
let there be no mistake: "respect" for the rule of law entails more than a one-sided
obligation for the United States to obey the relevant laws advocated by
asymmetricians. 93 It also means that we will expect others to comply with the law,
including those provisions that, in the words of John Paul Jones more than two
centuries ago, "protect" the nation, its vessels and aircraft, and their navigational
rights and freedoms.
With all the buildup it has been given, the new strategy must not fall short in
providing a fresh and proactive approach to a demonstrably new threat environ-
ment that has shaken a lot of people's confidence in the US national security sys-
tem. It should be a strategy of hope and action, rather than one born of despair and
cynicism. Whether you are an idealist aspiring to establish a shining city on the hill
that reveres the rule of law for its own sake, or a calculating utilitarian methodically
calibrating means to ends, there is much to value in a more robust rule of law,
forcefully advocated by the three maritime service chiefs. For the utilitarians, ask
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the Marines and soldiers in Fallujah, Ramadi and Kandahar whether the threat en-
vironment was better or worse after images of the disgraceful and lawless acts at the
Abu Ghraib prison flashed across the Internet and Al Jazeera. While you're at it, ask
them how it affected their pride as American service members. We cannot always
control the behavior of our members, but our service chiefs can be firm and un-
equivocal about the fundamental principles for which we stand.
It must seem to many that the world has not changed much since the interwar
years that drove Yeats to lament the loss of conviction by the best, the rise of pas-
sionate intensity by the worst, and the collapse of the "centre." 94 What he left un-
named is the source and nature of that center and how we might fortify it. For
many in Yeats' age, the ordering force to provide that center was to be found in the
hopeful vision of a new League of Nations. Their modern counterparts look to the
rule of law developed and implemented by forward-thinking States coming to-
gether in respected and competent international organizations. 9
I will close with a report on the informal surveys I conduct each year at my law
school. In the first week of classes back in Seattle I ask my students for their views
on the "rule of law." They have so far been unanimous in their approval of the prin-
ciple, though some are skeptical of its empirical record. But when I then ask them
to define the rule of law, their brows furrow and they grow silently pensive. We
shouldn't be too hard on them. Few law school casebooks attempt to describe the
rule of law or postulate its force or trajectory. And you will not be too surprised to
learn that the Department of Defense dictionary does not define it. We must work
to remedy that oversight. The legal profession has a well-earned reputation for per-
suasive communication. And I believe, as did Alexis de Tocqueville, 96 that we in the
legal profession have a special province and duty. If law is the logic and language of
global cooperation, we are its most proficient expositors. As such, it is, I believe, in-
cumbent upon us all to embrace the rule of law as our lodestar, as the "center" for
this tumultuous new century. 97 In short, it is time for us to take up the baton from
Professor O'Connell and advance it steadily forward toward that elusive finish line.
Postscript on US Accession to the 1982 LOS Convention
The legal experts widely agreed that the first challenge that must be met is to obtain
the necessary Senate and presidential action for the United States to accede to the
1982 LOS Convention. Nothing less than an all-agency full-court press will be suf-
ficient. If the three maritime services and their allied agencies fail to persuade the
Senate to approve the LOS Convention during the One Hundred Tenth Congress,
a maritime strategy that purports to affirm the importance of law to global security
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will have no credibility. Words without consistent action will soon be ignored and
forgotten.
The call for Senate action was renewed when, during his January 30, 2007 con-
firmation hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee to serve as Deputy Sec-
retary of State, former Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte
affirmed the administration's strong support for the Convention. One week later,
the Department of Defense once again included the LOS Convention on its treaty
priority list.98 The next day, the President's National Security Advisor, Stephen
Hadley, wrote to Senator Joseph Biden, the new Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, citing the "historic bipartisan support for the Law of the Sea
Convention" and requesting Senate action "as early as possible during the 110th
Congress." 99 On May 15, 2007, President Bush formally announced that he was
urging the Senate to give its advice and consent to accession to the Convention
during the current session of the Congress.100 On June 13, 2007, Deputy Secretary
of State Negroponte and Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England joined in
an op-ed supporting accession.' 0 ' The Navy and Coast Guard have long worked to
gain Senate approval for the Convention. A recommendation that the United
States accede to the Convention was the first resolution to come out of the US
Commission on Ocean Policy chaired by former CNO Admiral James Watkins. In
testimony before the Congress on March 1, 2007, Secretary of the Navy Donald
Winter, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Mullen and Commandant of the
Marine Corps James Conway unequivocally affirmed the Navy Department's sup-
port for US accession. 10 2 Admiral Thad Allen, Commandant of the Coast Guard,
similarly reaffirmed his service's support for accession on May 17, 2007.103
Thus, there is every reason to be optimistic about the fate of the 1982 LOS Con-
vention within the Senate this time. Painfully, however, we have been this close
once before. It seemed like success was at hand in 2004, when Senator Lugar pro-
vided the needed leadership on the Foreign Relations Committee to achieve a
unanimous recommendation out of that Committee that the US Senate should pro-
vide its assent. Somehow, however, a small but vocal opposition was able to persuade
the Senate leadership not to bring the treaty to a floor vote. 0 4 If the Senate cannot
now be persuaded to approve the LOS Convention, other parties to the Conven-
tion will continue to shape developments in the Commission on Continental Shelf
Limits, International Seabed Authority and International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea and, perhaps, add a gloss to the Convention's text through the recognized
process of agreed-upon interpretations.105
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